William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 2

Article 3

2011

Rising to the Challenge of the NAS Report
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward: A Call for Demonstrated
Competence amongst Legal Practitioners
Christine Funk
Evan Berman

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Funk, Christine and Berman, Evan (2011) "Rising to the Challenge of the NAS Report Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward: A Call for Demonstrated Competence amongst Legal Practitioners," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 37: Iss.
2, Article 3.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Funk and Berman: Rising to the Challenge of the NAS Report Strengthening Forensic

RISING TO THE CHALLENGE OF THE NAS REPORT
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD: A CALL FOR
DEMONSTRATED COMPETENCE AMONGST LEGAL
PRACTITIONERS1
Christine Funk † and Evan Berman††
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 684
II. SHIFTS IN THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE ......................................... 685
A. Procedural Changes........................................................... 685
B. Limits on Testimony .......................................................... 686
C. Standards of Admissibility ................................................. 687
D. The NAS Report and the Minnesota Court ......................... 688
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE STUDIES ON EYEWITNESS ID ... 689
IV. THE NAS REPORT .................................................................. 690
A. The Current State of Forensic Science .................................. 690
B. The Current State of the Legal Community ......................... 692

1. This article was inspired by a conversation between Christine Funk and
Robin Jones in June of 2010.
† Christine Funk has been an attorney for the Office of the Minnesota
Public Defender since 1994. She currently works as a member of the Trial Team,
where her duties include education of fellow public defenders, handling complex
litigation, and forensic issues. Ms. Funk is a member of the Minnesota Forensic
Laboratory Advisory Board. She also serves on the board of the Minnesota
Innocence Project.
Ms. Funk served as the sole state public defender
representative for the Technical Working Group on DNA for Defense Attorneys.
She speaks both nationally and internationally on various forensic science topics,
and teaches a short course for attorneys interested in learning forensic DNA
evidence. She is also an adjunct professor at William Mitchell College of Law.
†† Evan Berman attained his B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania, and
his M.A. in Judaic Studies from the Laura and Alvin Siegal College of Judaic
Studies. He has also attained full rabbinic ordination from the Chief Rabbinate of
Israel and has served as a congregational rabbi for the better part of the last
decade. He is author of two books on kabbala: God’s Bride: The Kabbala of the Sacred
Feminine and Shepherds, Sages, Meditations and Dreams: The Gateway of the Sephirot. He
is currently a law clerk at the Hastings Office of the Public Defender in Hastings,
Minnesota, and is in his second year at the University of Minnesota Law School.

683

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3

684

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

V. RAISING THE BAR IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM BY
IMPOSING MINIMUM STANDARDS: A PATH FORWARD ............ 695
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 697
“The law’s greatest dilemma in its heavy reliance on
forensic evidence, however, concerns the question of
whether—and to what extent—there is science in any given
2
‘forensic science’ discipline.”
I.

INTRODUCTION

In criminal prosecutions, the government increasingly relies
on forensic science. Eyewitness identification has been relied upon
much longer. But is this reliance misplaced? Both types of
evidence seemingly come with a degree of certainty. Yet there are
very real problems with the underlying reliability of both types of
evidence. In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences published a
3
report reviewing many forensic science disciplines.
In 2010,
Special Master Geoffrey Gaulkin issued a report to the New Jersey
4
Supreme Court on eyewitness identification. Both reports express
concern about limitations in these fields—limitations that juries,
5
lawyers, and judges alike may fail to fully appreciate.
Advances in the field of DNA testing, in part, brought to light
some serious problems in other disciplines of forensic science. As
DNA evidence exonerated the innocent, it became apparent that
“in some cases, substantive information and testimony based on
faulty forensic science analyses may have contributed to wrongful
6
convictions of innocent people.” Two issues are presented in the
NAS Report: First, there is a “potential danger of giving undue
weight to evidence and testimony derived from imperfect testing
7
and analysis.” Second, “imprecise or exaggerated expert testimony

2. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. & NAT’L RES.
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD 87 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT], available at http://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.
3. Id.
4. See Report of the Special Master at 18, State v. Henderson, 937 A.2d 988 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 7, 2008) (A-8-08), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us
/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%20BRIEF%20.PDF%20(00621142).PDF.
5. See generally id.; NAS REPORT, supra note 2.
6. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 4.
7. Id.
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has sometimes contributed to the admission of erroneous or
8
misleading evidence.” The NAS Report does not indicate to whom
it is referring when it speaks of the potential danger to give undue
9
weight to evidence and testimony, nor does it identify under what
10
circumstances erroneous or misleading evidence is admitted. At
the end of the day, however, it is the judge charged as gatekeeper,
the prosecutor admonished to be a minister of justice, and the
defense attorney as advocate for her client who have the obligation
to ensure the fact finder does not give undue weight to forensic
evidence and testimony. The obligation of the parties extends
further: both the lawyers and the judge have an obligation to
prevent or correct imprecise or exaggerated identification, forensic
testimony, and erroneous and misleading identification or forensic
evidence.
This can be accomplished, in part, by requiring lawyers whose
cases involve forensic science to demonstrate a level of competence
to use such evidence. Section II will discuss some recent, relevant
shifts in the legal landscape that seem to reflect an awareness of the
concerns of the NAS Report and advances in social sciences.
Sections III and IV discuss recent findings which illustrate the
limitations of eyewitness identification and certain forensic
sciences. Section V examines the NAS Report’s view of the needs
(and failings) of the legal community in regards to forensic
science. Section VI proposes a response to the current situation,
which should put the parties on better forensic science footing. In
conclusion, the authors note that if nothing is changed in the
criminal justice system, nothing will change.
II. SHIFTS IN THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
A. Procedural Changes
In March of 2010, Judge Nancy Gertner, a United States
district court judge in Massachusetts, issued a procedural order in
11
light of the NAS Report. She ordered parties before the court to

8.
9.
10.
11.
2010),
.pdf.

Id.
See id.
See id.
Procedural Order: Trace Evidence, Case 1:08-cr-10104-NG at 1 (D. Mass.
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/pdf/ProcOrderTraceEvidenceUPDATE
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identify whether or not the parties intended to introduce trace
evidence, whether a Daubert/Kumho hearing would be sought, and
12
to identify witnesses and exhibits. Judge Gertner observed that, in
the past, admissibility of many forms of forensic evidence was
“effectively presumed, largely because of its pedigree—the fact that
13
it had been admitted for decades.” In recognition of the NAS
Report, the order declared that trace evidence’s admissibility would
no longer be presumed, but rather that each case requires
14
individual, careful examination.
Judge Gertner observed, “To be sure, the court’s treatment of
this evidence relates directly to the adequacy of counsel’s
15
treatment,” which should not be lost on practitioners in the
criminal justice system.
B. Limits on Testimony
In October of 2009, Judge Paul Grimm, a magistrate judge in
the United States District Court of Maryland, issued a Report and
Recommendation restricting the testimony of the State’s firearms
expert after a hearing, finding:
[T]here is no meaningful distinction between a firearms
examiner saying that “the likelihood of another firearm
having fired these cartridges is so remote as to be
considered a practical impossibility” and saying that his
identification is “an absolute certainty.”
Neither is
justified based on the testimony at the hearing or the
literature and cases reviewed and discussed in this Report
and Recommendation, and neither is warranted by the
16
facts of this case.
As such, the recommendation limited the testimony such that
the witness “only be permitted to state his opinions and bases
17
without any characterization as to degree of certainty.” This and

12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2.
16. United States v. Willock, 696 F. Supp. 2d 536, 572–73 (D. Md. 2010).
17. Id. at 581–82. This second recommendation is followed by third and
fourth recommendations in the alternative, which would have allowed the
sergeant “to express his opinions ‘more likely than not’” or in the third alternative,
“to a reasonable degree of ballistic or technical certainty.” Id. at 582 (quotation
omitted).
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other recommendations were subsequently adopted by the trial
18
court.
C. Standards of Admissibility

19

On June 18, 2010, Special Master Geoffrey Gaulkin issued a
20
Report of the Special Master concerning eyewitness identification.
The Report was predicated on the review of over two hundred
published scientific studies, articles, and books submitted by the
21
parties. Additionally, seven expert witnesses testified over a ten22
day period. The special master was to determine whether the
standard of admissibility used in the Manson/Madison test was still
valid and appropriate “in light of recent scientific and other
23
evidence.” The Manson/Madison test involves two parts: First, the
court must decide if the eyewitness identification was
24
“impermissibly suggestive.” Second, the court must determine if
there is a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable
25
misidentification.” A subsequent analysis involves an evaluation of
the following factors: the “opportunity of the witness to view the
[suspect] at the time of the crime, the witness’s degree of attention,
the accuracy of [the witness’s] prior description of the [suspect],
the level of certainty demonstrated at the time of the
confrontation, and the time between the crime and the
26
confrontation.” The report continues, “The short answer to the
Court’s question whether the Manson/Madison test and procedures
are ‘valid and appropriate in light of recent scientific and other
27
evidence’ is that they are not.”

18. Id. at 548.
19. The reader may be surprised to see a section on eyewitness identification
included in a paper on forensic science.
However, we recognize the
recommendation of the researchers quoted in Special Master Gaulkin’s Report,
“that eyewitness identifications be regarded as a form of trace evidence . . . .”
Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 10.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting State v. Henderson, 2009 WL 510409, at *2 (N.J. Feb. 26,
2009)).
24. State v. Henderson, 937 A.2d 988, 995 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008)
(quoting State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 182−83 (N.J. 2006)).
25. Id. (quoting State v. Madison, 536 A.2d 254, 258 (N.J. 1988)).
26. Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 6 (quoting Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)).
27. Id. at 79.
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Special Master Gaulkin concluded that, just as with physical
trace and scientific evidence, the burden should initially be on the
28
prosecution to establish that the eyewitness is reliable.
This
“reliability inquiry” of course, would be expanded “beyond police
misconduct to evaluate memory as fragile, difficult to verify and
subject to contamination from initial encoding to ultimate
29
reporting.”
Placing the burden on the proponent of the
eyewitness identification evidence is both “scientifically proper and
30
procedurally wise.” Further, Special Master Gaulkin observed “it
would be appropriate and useful for [the] Court to take all
available steps to assure that judges and juries are informed of and
31
guided by the scientific findings.”
D. The NAS Report and the Minnesota Court
In State v. Hull, the Minnesota Supreme Court first
acknowledged the NAS Report and the impact it may have on
32
future court cases. Hull argued on appeal that he should have
been allowed a prong one Frye-Mack hearing on the admissibility of
33
Citing
both fingerprint evidence and handwriting analysis.
harmless error in light of other evidence, the court declined to
34
address the issue. Justice Meyer likewise found the error harmless
35
in her concurring opinion. However, Justice Meyer pointed out
that the failure of the trial court to allow for a prong one hearing
leads to an incomplete and unreliable record, upon which no
36
decision could be based. Justice Meyer’s concurring opinion does
not presumptively preclude the admissibility of fingerprint
evidence, handwriting analysis, or any other forensic evidence.
However, like Judge Gertner and Special Master Gaulkin before
her, Justice Meyer suggests, “in order to present expert conclusions
28. Id. at 84.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 85.
31. Id.
32. State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 104 n.4 (Minn. 2010).
33. Id. at 104. Under the first prong of the Frye-Mack test “the court asks
‘whether experts in the field widely share the view that the results of scientific
testing are scientifically reliable.’” Id. at 103 (quoting State v. Roman Nose, 649
N.W.2d 815, 819 (Minn. 2002)).
34. Id. at 104.
35. Id. at 110−11 (Meyer, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 109.
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based on these methods to a jury, the proponent of the evidence
must first meet its burden under the first prong of Frye-Mack to
show that its forensic evidence methods produce accurate and
37
reliable results.”
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE STUDIES ON EYEWITNESS ID
Whereas the error rate with regard to many forensic
disciplines is unknown, there has been a great deal of study done to
ascertain how effective eyewitness identification really is. The
findings are fairly consistent. In archival studies in the United
Kingdom, 39% of over three thousand witnesses correctly
38
identified the suspect, but 21% falsely identified fillers. Because
only 60% actually made identifications, the misidentifications
39
amount to 35% of the “positive identifications.” Other studies
indicate that, in actual cases, the error rate is approximately one in
40
three.
Studies have shown that misidentification is a practical reality.
A 1978 meta-analysis that reviewed 345 studies found “there is less
than one chance in a million that a non-blind test administrator
41
has no influence on the behavior of the subject.”
Studies
uniformly show witness confidence and witness accuracy are not
closely correlated. Suggestive procedures can enhance witness
confidence, post-identification feedback can likewise enhance
confidence, and witness perceptions about the ability to observe an
individual—as well as their attention to detail at the time of
42
observation—is inflated in relation to level of confidence. That
said, studies have shown that jurors are not receptive to this
information. They tend to “underestimate the importance of
proven indicators of accuracy,” and rely heavily on things such as
witness confidence, which is not a good indicator of accuracy,
overestimating a witness’s ability to consistently and accurately
43
identify a subject. Studies with mock jurors further indicate that
expert testimony can “sensitize” people to the issues, which can

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 110.
Report of the Special Master, supra note 4, at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20. (citations omitted).
Id. at 33−36.
Id. at 49.
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44

IV. THE NAS REPORT
A. The Current State of Forensic Science
The NAS Report provides practitioners in the law with
information they might otherwise not be aware of. “Often there
are no standard protocols governing forensic practice in a given
45
discipline.” In other words, there is no well defined methodology.
One is free to do their work any way they choose. “The simple
reality is that the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always
46
based on scientific studies to determine its validity.”
When there are protocols, “they often are vague and not
47
enforced in any meaningful way.” With no standard protocols, a
technique cannot be effectively validated. There is no way to assure
that the science is being done “correctly.” The limits of the system
cannot be tested where the system is not defined. For example,
with shoeprint analysis, individual characteristics from a questioned
48
shoe print are compared with a possible source. However, “there
is no defined threshold that must be surpassed, nor are there any
studies that associate the number of matching characteristics with
the probability that the impressions were made by a common
49
source.” An illustration of what this means, practically speaking, is
provided by the NAS Report. When given identical cases of new
shoes with accidental identifying characteristics, “there were
considerable differences in the conclusions reached by different
50
laboratories examining identical cases.” In order for a test to be
considered “scientific” the technique must be testable and
reproducible. The testing done in the area of questioned shoe
prints seems to suggest the method is not reproducible from lab to
lab.
Arson is similarly situated. According to the NAS Report,
“Despite the paucity of research, some arson investigators continue

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148 (citation omitted).
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to make determinations about whether or not a particular fire was
51
set.” The NAS Report notes “much more research is needed,” in
areas such as “the natural variability of burn patterns and damage
characteristics and how they are affected by the presence of various
52
accelerants.”
Even if different analysts follow the same protocol, there can
still be an issue regarding reproducibility.
Fingerprint
examination, for example, relies on the Analysis, Comparison,
53
Evaluation, and Verification (ACE-V) method. According to the
NAS Report, the same ACE-V fingerprint identification protocol
“does not guarantee that two analysts following it will obtain the
54
same results.” In other words, repeatability is not assured simply
by following the protocol. The ACE-V method is “too broad to
55
ensure repeatability and transparency.” As such, ACE-V “is not
specific enough to qualify as a validated method for this type of
56
analysis.”
The NAS Report holds forensic DNA evidence in high regard,
noting, “With the exception of . . . DNA analysis, . . . no forensic
method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to
consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a
57
connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”
Interpretation of DNA profiles, however, particularly in mixed
samples, seems to have some of the same problems as the ACE-V
method when it comes to reproducibility. Proof of this can be
found in a study done by New Scientist, published in August of
58
2010. In the study, New Scientist took a mixed sample of DNA,
59
Kerry Robinson was
generated from a gang rape in Georgia.
convicted, in part, based on the findings of two crime lab analysts
who reviewed the data and could not exclude Mr. Robinson as a
60
contributor to the sample. New Scientist took that same sample
and sent it to seventeen experienced analysts at a single,

51. Id. at 173.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 137.
54. Id. at 142.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 7.
58. Linda Geddes, Between Prison and Freedom, NEW SCIENTIST, Aug. 14, 2010, at
8–11, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/36034274/New-Scientist-2010-08-14.
59. Id. at 9.
60. Id.
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61

unidentified lab in the United States. The results may surprise the
lay reader and lawyer alike. Instead of unanimous agreement, only
one scientist concurred with the trial testimony, that Mr. Robinson
62
could not be excluded as a possible contributor to the sample.
Four analysts made a finding of “inconclusive” and an astonishing
twelve scientists actually excluded Mr. Robinson from being a
63
possible contributor to the sample.
There is also a dearth of studies on error rates in some forensic
science fields. The rate of error in a given discipline is, in essence,
“proportions of cases in which the analysis led to a false
64
conclusion.” There are not systems that are well defined which
65
can be relied on to determine rates of error. Distinct from an
“error rate” is the issue of when and how errors occur. This,
likewise, is not currently known.
The NAS Report has some fairly harsh words regarding the
courts as gatekeepers. “There is nothing to indicate that courts
66
review bite mark evidence pursuant to Daubert’s standard of
67
reliability.” Further, “[t]here is little to indicate that courts review
68
firearms evidence pursuant to Daubert’s standard of reliability.”
B. The Current State of the Legal Community
Chapter 8 of the NAS Report is dedicated to “Education and
69
Training in Forensic Science.” Among the needs identified is the
need “to educate the users of forensic science analyses, especially
70
those in the legal community.” The Committee asserts parties,
lawyers, and judges alike, would “benefit from a greater

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 9, 11.
64. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 120.
65. Id. at 188.
66. The Daubert admissibility standard includes consideration of the
following, nonbinding factors: (1) “whether a theory or technique . . . can be
(and has been) tested”; (2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected
to peer review and publication”; (3) “the court ordinarily should consider the
known or potential rate of error”; (4) “the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique’s operation”; and (5) “‘general acceptance’
can yet have a bearing on the inquiry.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993).
67. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 107 n.81.
68. Id. at 107 n.82.
69. Id. at 217.
70. Id. at 218.
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understanding of the scientific bases underlying the forensic
science disciplines and how the underlying scientific validity of
71
While the
techniques affects the interpretation of findings.”
Report had much to say about the shortcomings of forensic
science, it is unfair to lay the blame entirely on the forensic
scientists. The parties in the legal system are “encumbered by,
among other things, judges and lawyers who generally lack the
scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic
72
evidence in an informed manner . . . .” As such, “the legal system
is ill-equipped to correct the problems of the forensic science
73
community.”
In reviewing reported decisions in criminal cases, an
interesting pattern comes to light. In these reported cases, trial
court judges “rarely exclude or restrict expert testimony offered by
74
prosecutors . . . .” Likewise, reported decisions “also indicate that
appellate courts routinely deny appeals contesting trial court
decisions admitting forensic evidence against criminal
75
defendants.” Of concern in reviewing this pattern is that despite
“serious issues regarding the capacity and quality of the current
forensic science system[,] . . . the courts continue to rely on
forensic evidence without fully understanding and addressing the
76
limitations of different forensic science disciplines.”
There has long been a presumption that the forensic science
at issue is solid, and that the practitioner got it absolutely correct.
77
However, the Committee disagrees. “In short, the interpretation
of forensic evidence is not infallible. Quite the contrary. This
reality is not always fully appreciated or accepted by many forensic
science practitioners, judges, jurors, policymakers, or lawyers and
78
their clients.”
This lack of education and understanding is coupled with a
pattern of admissibility, particularly in criminal cases. “Unlike the

71. Id.
72. Id. at 110.
73. Id. at 53.
74. Id. at 11; see also Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to
Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, S107, S113
(Supp. 2005) (“Although scientific evidence is often more reliable than other
types of evidence, not all that purports to be ‘science,’ is.”).
75. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
76. Id. at 85.
77. Id. at 87–88.
78. Id. (citation omitted).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2011

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3

694

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:2

extremely well-litigated civil challenges, the criminal defendant’s
challenge is usually perfunctory. Even when the most vulnerable
forensic sciences—hair microscopy, bite marks, and handwriting—
are attacked, the courts routinely affirm admissibility citing earlier
79
decisions rather than facts established at a hearing.” In addition,
the defense bar generally appears to “lack the requisite knowledge
and skills, as well as the funds, to succeed” in mounting a
80
challenge.
Consider the following examples. Imagine a woman, missing
for three days, is found dead and naked in the woods. Time of
death is declared “give or take ten minutes.” Imagine a forensic
scientist testifying, “The only difference between the defendant’s
DNA profile and the mixed sample from the gun is that the alleles
on the gun are stochastically imbalanced.”
Imagine a fire
investigator testifying, “Evidence of arson includes alligator
spaulding.” To the casual reader, these statements may appear to
be obvious evidence of guilt. Experts in the fields of forensic
pathology, DNA evidence, and arson would strongly disagree. The
statements are scientifically unsupportable—in some instances,
even nonsensical. Should the prosecutor, defense attorney, and
judge—untrained in forensic science—be faced with such a
statement from a scientist (due to poor training, incompetence, or
a desire to advance the evidence in a misleading or exaggerated
way), lawyers may fail to appreciate the falseness of the claim. Even
with vigorous cross-examination, once committed, it is unlikely that
a forensic scientist will acknowledge they overstated or misstated
the science.
Consider more likely scenarios. An expert testifies the
defendant cannot be excluded from DNA found at the crime
scene. Another testifies in an arson case that the presence of an
accelerant was detected. In addition to the potential for false
claims, more likely scenarios are the failure of prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges to appreciate the significance, or lack
thereof, of seemingly sound scientific statements.
When a
conclusion such as “the defendant cannot be excluded” is
presented by a forensic scientist, the attorney’s response, for
example, should not be to (1) charge out a crime or (2) seek a plea
bargain, but rather ask, what is the significance of this failure to

79.
80.

Id. at 107 (quoting Neufeld, supra note 74, at S110).
Id.
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exclude? How many other random people in the population could
not be excluded? One in ten thousand? Or one in two?
Regarding the presence of an accelerant, if the alleged arson
occurred in a garage, an attorney can cross-examine on gasoline
being stored in garages, present in lawn mowers, snow blowers,
cars, and the like. But what about wood floors in homes built in
the 1970s or earlier? How many people are aware that gasoline was
used as a paint thinner? These are only a few examples. The need
for education and subsequent competence in the area of forensic
science is essential to quality representation—on both sides of the
aisle.
V. RAISING THE BAR IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM BY IMPOSING
MINIMUM STANDARDS: A PATH FORWARD
The report finds that the existing legal regime—including
the rules governing the admissibility of forensic evidence,
the applicable standards governing appellate review of
trial court decisions, the limitations of the adversary
process, and judges and lawyers who often lack the
scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate
forensic evidence—is inadequate to the task of curing the
81
documented ills of the forensic science disciplines.
With the criminal justice system currently inadequate to cure the
documented ills, what is to be done? The NAS Report notes,
“Unfortunately, it might be too late to effectively train most lawyers
82
and judges once they enter their professional fields.” If this is the
case, we must wait a generation to begin to address the problem
adequately. Alternatively, the parties in the criminal justice system
can trust the forensic science community to fix the problem itself.
Neither answer seems satisfactory. Another alternative, however,
does exist.
Funding must be set aside to train judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys in the underpinnings of science. The truth of
the matter is lawyers are presented with forensic evidence that they
are ill equipped to handle. “A fear of science won’t cut it in an age
when many pleas of guilty are predicated on the reports of
scientific experts. Every public defender’s office should have at

81.
82.

Id. at 85.
Id. at 236.
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least one lawyer who is not afraid of a test tube.”
Without education, lawyers are inadequate to handle the task
of appropriately assessing the value and reasonableness of forensic
science findings. Education, of course, costs money. It is
inefficient to educate lawyers in forensic science as part of the law
84
school curriculum, as suggested by the NAS Report. Many will go
their entire career without dealing with a forensic science case,
where others deal with forensic science as a matter of course.
Perhaps the best approach, then, is to impose additional
requirements on those lawyers who handle forensic evidence. One
possibility is to require a showing of a level of competence beyond
the standard bar exam. The proposal to require certification is not
without precedent. For example, in California, lawyers appointed
as lead or associate counsel for death penalty cases must meet
85
requirements beyond bar passage.
Pennsylvania likewise has
additional requirements, including a minimum number of hours of
86
training specifically on death penalty issues. Philadelphia County
has additional requirements, including that the lawyer “[i]s familiar
with, and experienced in the use of expert witnesses and scientific
and medical evidence, including, but not limited to, psychiatric
87
and pathological evidence.”
Practically speaking, applying the requirement to judges would
be more challenging. While some counties have certain judges
assigned solely to criminal cases, other counties use their judges as
“jacks of all trades.” Some counties have only a few judges
presiding over the caseload. Is it practical for one judge to be
required to be certified in a two-judge county? When balancing the
need for education of the judiciary against the very real possibility
of a wrongful conviction, the answer seems obvious. While more
research is being done, studies suggest courts “employ Daubert
more lackadaisically in criminal trials—especially in regard to
prosecution evidence—than in civil cases—especially in regard to
88
plaintiff evidence.” In light of the fact that forensic science is

83. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND
HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 162 (2003).
84. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 236.
85. CAL. R. OF CT. 8.605.
86. PA. R. CRIM. P. 801.
87. PHILA. CO. CRIM. DIV. R. 406-1.
88. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 n.21 (citing 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL.,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1.35, at
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being admitted in courtrooms across the country as a matter of
course, it is surprising that “[i]n most forensic science disciplines,
no studies have been conducted of large populations to establish
89
the uniqueness of marks or features.” If the judiciary is not aware
of this and has not been trained on the significance of this, how
can they be effective gatekeepers?
Of course, if a judge is not interested in such special training,
those cases could be assigned to a visiting judge. Alternatively,
perhaps lawyers could be given the option of filing on a
noncertified judge as an additional safeguard, over and above the
current allowance.
VI. CONCLUSION
Eyewitness identification and forensic science have at least two
things in common: both sets of testimony are subject to error and
both have the distinct capacity to overcome the burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt necessary to gain criminal conviction.
The 2009 NAS Report points out the limits of many fields of
90
forensic science.
Studies on eyewitness identification routinely
91
show a high error rate when it comes to positive identification.
Effective cross-examination and meaningful jury instructions have
not proven sufficient to challenge the testimony of these witnesses.
Education for legal practitioners involved in cases wherein forensic
science is presented must be implemented.
The subtitle to the NAS report states: “A Path Forward.” As
long as the justice system continues to do things the way they have
always been done, the system will not be moving forward. The
forensic science community has taken steps to reexamine and
92
improve practices. The legal community must do so as well.

105 (2007–2008 ed.)).
89. Id. at 188–89.
90. Id. at 8.
91. See Report of the Special Master, supra note 4.
92. For example, a federal grant has been awarded to try to determine the
rate of error in latent fingerprint evidence. See HARRY T. EDWARDS, THE NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCES: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE
BENCH AND BAR 3 (2010), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf_lib/The%20Nas
%20Report%20on%20 Forensic%20Science.pdf.
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